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Recovery of Accrued but Unpaid Interest on War-Lost
Investments Taxed as Capital Gain to Extent
It Exceeds Basis-Horst v. United States*
Prior to the United States entry into World War II, taxpayer
acquired certain Japanese bonds. In December 1941, pursuant to
section 127(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,1 he suffered
a war loss with respect to these investments and took the proper
deduction. When trading restrictions on Japanese bonds were lifted
in 1950, taxpayer enjoyed a war loss recovery. At that time, bonds of
this type were being traded flat, the quoted price reflecting both principal and accrued but unpaid interest thereon to the date of recovery.2 As the defaulted interest coupons were paid on their
extended maturity dates, in accordance with an agreement with the
Japanese government, taxpayer reported the amounts received as
ordinary income. Later, in an action by the taxpayer for a refund
relating to these payments, held, judgment for plaintiff. Since recovery of war-lost bonds of a type which are being traded flat on the
recovery date is analogous to a purchase of bonds flat, delayed payments of accrued but unpaid interest on such bonds are returns of
capital to the extent of basis, and capital gains to the extent that
they exceed basis.
In order to obviate the confusion and uncertainty inherent in
establishing the loss of property destroyed or seized by the enemy
during World War II, 8 Congress enacted section 127 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939.4 By ·virtue of section 127(a), property
located in enemy countries was presumed lost on the date war was
declared by the United States, and the taxpayer was entitled to a
loss deduction to the extent that such a deduction would be of
benefit to him in the year of the loss. In computing this deduction,
the taxpayer was not required to consider the possibility of recovery
• 331 F.2d 879 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 127, added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 852 (1942), as amended,
ch. 521, §§ 34l(a)-(b), 65 Stat. 511 (1951). Sections 127(a) and 127(b) dealing with losses

were deleted from the 1954 Code. The recovery portions of the 1939 Code were carried
over. The present war loss recovery provisions appear in INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954,
§§ 1331-37.
2. The price of a bond that is in default is usually quoted "flat." The purchase
price includes not only the title to the securities but also the right to receive previously
defaulted interest. See PRIME, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 105 (2d ed. 1952).
3. See also United States v. S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398 (1927), for a
judicial effort to ascertain a World War I loss; S. REP. No. 1931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
127 (1942).
4. For a discussion of the operation of the war loss provisions, see generally Carrol,
Tax Relief for War Losses, 21 TAXES 491 (1943); Simon, The Presumptions of Section
127, 27 TAXES 791 (1949); Note, War Losses-Revenue Act of 1912, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. R.Ev.
112' (1944). ·For critical analysis and suggested improvements of the recovery provisions,
see generally Kramer, War Losses, Their Continuing Effect Under Section 127, 30 TAXES
376 (1952); Tarleau, Recovery of War Losses-Tax Effects, 80 J. ACCOUNTANCY 168 (1945).
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of the property at a future date.15 However, the mere restoration of
the value of a war-lost investment, such as by acknowledgment of
liability by the debtor, was treated as a "recovery" of the investment
which had been considered as destroyed or seized. 6 With respect to
such a subsequent recovery, initially the taxpayer would be entitled
to tax-free recovery up to the amount of his unused war loss, that is,
that portion of his original loss that did not reduce his tax in the
year of loss.7 That portion of his war loss which did result in a prior
tax benefit would be taxed as ordinary income,8 and that portion
of the recovery which exceeded the taxpayer's basis for all property
involved in his prior war losses would be treated as gain on an
involuntary conversion and taxed at capital gain rates, if at all.9
The unadjusted basis of the recovered property would be an amount
equal to the fair market value of such property determined as of
the date of the recovery10 unless the taxpayer elected the statutory
option available to him under the 1951 amendment to the recovery
provisions. 11 As can readily be seen, the primary purpose of the
recovery provisions was to insure that war losses which had resulted
in prior tax savings would be included in ordinary income when
that which had been lost was eventually recovered. 12
Although the war loss provisions provide for the tax treatment
of war-lost property both in the year of loss and in the year of the
recovery, they contain no explicit provision for the treatment of
interest accruing between the date of loss and the date of recovery.
As a result, the courts have been called upon to determine the
appropriate designation of accrued but unpaid interest on the date
of recovery and to determine the proper tax treatment of payments
of such defaulted interest subsequent to the date of recovery. In
Shafer v. United States, 18 Afia Finance Corp., 14 and Revenue Ruling
58-275,15 it has been held that these delayed payments of defaulted
interest are taxable as ordinary income. On the other hand, the
5. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 127(b), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 852 (1942); Shabmoon
v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1950). See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
127 (1942).
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.1334-1 (1957).
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1332(b)(l).
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1332(b)(2).
"'
9. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1332(b)(3). "If property ••• is compulsorily or involuntarily converted ••• into property similar or related in service or use to the property
so converted, no gain shall be recognized." INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1033(a). See INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
IO. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1336(a). See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1332(a).
11. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1333 and text accompanying notes 28-30 infra.
12. George C. Dix, 34 T.C. 837, 841 (1960).
13. 204 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Ohio 1962), afj'd on opinion below, 312 F.2d 747 (6th
Cir. 1963).
14. 41 T.C. 255 (1963).
15. Rev. Rul. 58-275, 1958-1 CUM. BULL. 22.
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Horst case is the first to be decided in the taxpayer's favor. In Horst
the court pointed out that war-lost property is nonexistent for tax
purposes and concluded that the payments received were not interest income because it is not possible to recover payments for the
use of nonexistent property. 16 In addition, since bonds of the type
in question were being traded flat on the recovery date, the court
held that the recovery was equivalent to a "purchase" of bonds flat.
Therefore, it applied the flat purchase rule, which permits a taxpayer who acquires defaulted bonds flat to treat subsequent payments of interest then in default as partial returns of capital rather
than as ordinary income. 17
The decision in Horst is subject to forceful criticism for the way
in which it employed the commonly cited fiction 18 that war-lost
property ceases to exist for tax purposes until a recovery is made.
Revenue Ruling 58-275 and the Shafer and Afia cases take the position that despite the war loss, the debtor-creditor relationship continues and the delayed payments are interest income received for
the use of the taxpayer's money. 19 The contrary position taken by
the Horst court seems untenable. War-lost property is deemed to
be nonexistent for deduction purposes. Since the taxpayer is given
a loss deduction when war is declared without regard to any possibility of a future recovery, courts have felt obliged· to deny additional deductions and have done so by resorting to this fiction of
nonexistence. Thus, courts have disallowed subsequent deductions
for fire losses20 and depreciation21 with respect to war-lost property.
The Horst court is in error in attempting to employ the fiction of
nonexistence, however, as a justification for treating the "loss" and
the "recovery" as totally independent events. In fact, the recovery
provisions necessarily treat these events as correlative by providing
for the inclusion in taxable income of recoveries to the extent they
resulted in a tax saving in the year of loss. This treatment is much
more closely related to treating the taxpayer as if his recovered
16. Horst v. United States, 331 F.2d 879, 882-83 (Ct. CI. 1964). Interest on indebtedness has generally been defined as "the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the
parties for the use, or forbearance, or detention of money." Fall River Elcc. Light Co.,
23 B.T.A. 168, 171 (1931); Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940). See MERTENS, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 6.01 (1962).
17. Horst v. United States, supra note 16, at 882-83. To the extent it exceeds basis,
it is treated as capital gain.
18. Weinmann v. United States, 278 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1960); Kenmore v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1953); Shahmoon v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.
1950); George C. Dix, 34 T.C. 837, 841 (1960). See Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1 (1957).
19. Shafer v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 473, 475 (S.D. Ohio 1962), afj'd on opinion
below, 312 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1963); Afia Fin. Corp., 41 T.C. 255, 267 (1963); Rev. Ru!.
58-275, 1958-1 CuM. BuLL. 2. See Horst v. United States, 331 F.2d 879, 885 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
20. Kenmore v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1953).
21. Shahmoon v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1950).
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property had never been lost than it is to treating him as if the
same property were newly acquired. This position is supported by
the Senate Finance Committee's report accompanying the 1951
amendment to the recovery provisions, which makes it clear that
it is "appropriate to treat the taxpayer as nearly as possible as if he
had held the property throughout the entire period and received no
deduction for the temporary loss." 22
The validity of the decision in Horst is also questionable because of the court's application of the flat purchase rule. In the Afia
case, faced with a claim similar to the one presented in Horst, the
court refused to apply the flat purchase rule because it felt the
taxpayer had been the owner of the indebtedness at all relevant
times and that his receipt of new bonds to replace his war-lost bonds
did not qualify as a purchase of bonds flat. 23 Although the Afia case
can be distinguished from Horst because the bonds of the type in
question were not being traded flat on the recovery date, the fact
remains that the taxpayer in Horst did not actually purchase bonds
on the recovery date. Instead, he enjoyed a war loss recovery which
by judicial definition is merely a "kind of constructive acquisition"
of temporarily lost property.24 Although the flat purchase rule is
commonly stated in terms of the acquisition of defaulted bonds, the
rule has been applied almost without exception only in cases in
which there has been an actual purchase.25 Such a requirement is
more consistent with the theory behind the rule. In a typical flat purchase, in return for a fixed sum of money the buyer obtains title to
defaulted interest coupons as well as to the bond itself, the fair
market value of both these elements being reflected in the basis of the
acquired property.26 Thus, when a defaulted interest coupon is paid,
22. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 53, 54 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
23. Alia Fin. Corp., 41 T.C. 255, 268 (1963). But see Rev. Rul. 54-501, 1954-2 CuM.
BuLL. 197, in which the Commissioner ruled that the right to collect accrued but
unpaid interest would be considered as part of the new bonds received. In effect, it
seems the Commissioner included accrued interest in the recovery basis.
24. See George C. Dix, 34 T.C. 837, 841 (1960). The statute itself does not define
"recovery."
25. E.g., Carman v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1951); Hamilton C. Rickaby,
27 T.C. 886 (1957). Shattuck v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 416 (1955). Contra, Ann T.
Simpson, 11 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ,r 42059 (1942) (beneficiary of estate received notes with
defaulted interest coupons attached).
26. United States v. Langston, 308 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1962); Hamilton C. Rickaby,
27 T.C. 886 (1957); R. 0. Holton &: Co., 44 B.T.A. 202 (1941). However, the interest
must have actually accrued as of the date of purchase. First Ky. Co. v. Gray, 309 F.2d
845 (6th Cir. 1962). Contra, Campbell v. Sailor, 224 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1955).
27. The flat purchase rule does not apply to interest defaulted after the taxpayer
acquires the bonds. Fisher v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1954). National City
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 197 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1952); Warner A. Shattuck, 25 T.C.
416 (1955). Erskine Hewitt, 30 B.T.A. 962 (1934). See generally Hellawell, Capital Gains
Problems in Particular Areas-Dispositions of Evidences of Indebtedness, 12 W. REs.
L. REV. 350, 362-63; 34 CHI.-KENT L. R.Ev. 157 (1956); 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 5.06 (1962).
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a part of the buyer's initial investment is being returned to him.
He is not receiving a payment of interest for the use of his money.
In the Horst case, the flat purchase rule should not have been applied because the taxpayer did not purchase defaulted coupons
from the Japanese government. As a result, when the defaulted interest coupons were paid, it could not be said that a part of taxpayer's investment in defaulted coupons was being returned to him,
because he had never made such an investment. In reality, he was
receiving interest income for the use of his property.27
The Horst decision can also be challenged on the ground that
under its interpretation cases turn upon whether the taxpayer
exercises the statutory election made available to him by the 1951
amendment to the recovery provisions. That amendment was enacted in an attempt to alleviate the harsh treatment afforded taxpayers
who took war-loss deductions as to several pieces of property only
some of which were recovered.28 When the election is availed of,
the taxpayer may exclude the value of the recovered property from
income in the year of recovery and give such property a basis equal
to its adjusted basis on the date of loss. 29 His deduction in the year
of loss must then be reduced by the amount of the adjusted basis
of the recovered property on the date of loss and the tax in that
year must be recomputed. The resulting increase in the tax in the
year of loss must then be added to the tax for the year of recovery.80 In this way, any appreciation in the value of the specific
property recovered is protected from taxation at ordinary income
rates. Without the election, such protection would not have been
afforded if the total tax benefits from all war-lost property exceeded
the original basis of the property actually recovered.
The Horst court distinguished the decision in Shafer on the
ground that the taxpayer there had elected, according to the statutory
option, to retain the basis of his property as of the date of loss. Since
that basis did not reflect the value of defaulted interest, the Horst
court argued that later payments in Shafer were properly designated
as interest income rather than as returns of capital.31 By virtue of
28. S. REP. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 53-54 (1951). For example, assume a taxpayer
took a war loss deduction of $20,000 due to the loss of two pieces of property, each
having an adjusted basis of $10,000 on the date of loss. Further, assume that the taxpayer recovered only one of the two pieces of lost property and that on the date of
recovery that piece of property had appreciated to a value of $15,000. Without the
statutory election, the entire $15,000 recovery would be taxed as ordinary income. On
the other hand, with the statutory election, only the original $10,000 basis would be
used in computing the tax on recovery and appreciation in value would not be subjected to taxation at ordinary income rates. If the taxpayer had lost only one piece
of property, appreciation in value could not have been taxed at ordinary income rates
because his original deduction could not have exceeded the basis of the lost property
on the date of loss.
29. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1333(1).
30. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1333(2).
31. Horst v. United States, 331 F.2d 879, 884 (1964).
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the distinction drawn by the court in the principal case, payments
of accrued but unpaid interest to a taxpayer who exercised the
statutory option in order to protect the appreciation in the value
of his property would be taxed as ordinary income; but, a tax.payer
who did not find it necessary to exercise the option would not be
so taxed. Thus, by drawing this attenuated distinction, the Horst
court has seemingly impaired the congressional effort to protect
appreciation in the value of war-lost investments for every taxpayer.
Furthermore, it seems implausible that Congress would have intended this election process to be determinative of the tax on accrued but unpaid interest.
By adding defaulted interest as a part of the basis of the "recovery," the Horst court created for itself a dilemma. It then had to
strain to conclude that that same interest would not also be taxed
as income or there would be double taxation. Had the accrued interest not been treated as part of the basis of the recovered property, the court would have been able to tax it as income. Realistically,
there can be no loss suffered as to that which had not been acquired
as of the date of loss,32 and no recovery as to that which had not been
lost initially. Thus, the most consistent policy would be to treat as
a "war loss recovery" only the principal of the investment which
had been originally deducted as a war loss, treating later payments
of accrued interest separately as normal interest income rather than
as part of basis.33 An exception to this policy should not be made
simply because bonds of the type in question were being traded
flat on the recovery date. The problem of determining that portion
of the market value on the recovery date which is attributable to
the value of the defaulted interest could be easily solved. Such a
determination could be made by taking that portion of the market
value of the bonds on the recovery date which is equal to the ratio
of the amount of the interest defaulted to the sum of the original
war loss plus the amount of defaulted interest.34 Although the
possible ramifications and limitations of the Horst decision are unclear, its obvious defects make it questionable authority and indicate
that the position of the previous authorities is more justified.
32. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Co. v. United States, 214 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1954).
33. Such interest should be taxed at ordinary rates under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 61.
34. The Supreme Court has already treated a tax problem related to interest coupons on bonds owned by Mr. Horst. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).

